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SUMMARY 
 
Earthquake Early Warning Systems (EEWS), based on real-time prediction of ground motion or 
structural response measures, may play a role in reducing vulnerability and/or exposition of 
buildings and lifelines. In fact, recently seismologists developed efficient methods for rapid 
estimation of event features by means of limited information of the P-waves. Then, when an event 
is occurring, probabilistic distributions of magnitude and source-to-site distance are available and 
the prediction of the ground motion at the site, conditioned to the seismic network measures, may 
be performed in analogy with the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA). Consequently 
the structural performance may be obtained by the Probabilistic Seismic Demand Analysis 
(PSDA), and used for real-time risk management purposes. However, such prediction is performed 
in very uncertain conditions which have to be taken into proper account to limit false and missed 
alarms. In the present study, real-time risk analysis for early warning purposes is discussed. The 
magnitude estimation is performed via the Bayesian approach, while the earthquake localization is 
based on the Voronoi cells. To test the procedure it was applied, by simulation, to the EEWS 
under development in the Campanian region (southern Italy). The results lead to the conclusion 
that the PSHA, conditioned to the EEWS, correctly predicts the hazard at the site and that the 
false/missed alarm probabilities may be controlled by set up of an appropriate decisional rule and 
alarm threshold. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An Earthquake Early Warning System (EEWS) is made of a network of seismic instruments which can provide 
real-time measures, on an occurring event, to some central processing station, which elaborates the information 
for risk management purposes [Heaton, 1985]. In fact, EEWS may help in real-time vulnerability/exposition 
reduction to minimize losses, or in directing rescue operations immediately after an earthquake for emergency 
preparedness [Wieland, 2001]. The “early” information, provided by the EEWS in the first seconds of the 
earthquake, may be used, to spread the alarm to the community, to infer data or to activate different types of 
security measures, such as shut down of critical systems and stopping of high speed trains [Veneziano and 
Papadimitriou, 1998]. 
Earthquake Early Warning Systems may be simplistically classified, on the basis of the seismic network 
configuration, as regional or site-specific. Regional EEWS’ typically would consist of a number of seismic 
stations covering a potential source zone. Such systems are designed to provide data that can be used to estimate 
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the main parameters of the event, as time of origin, magnitude and location and to predict ground motion at some 
other sites in a large area (rapid response system). This processing may require significant time and therefore 
these systems are mainly devoted to near-real-time applications as shake maps, which are territorial distributions 
of ground shaking  employed for emergency management [Wald et al., 1999]. For critical facilities with a large 
loss potential, a fence of seismic instruments may be placed around the equipment to protect it. This is the case 
of site-specific EEWS’, which reduce the risk connected to the failure of nuclear power plants or lifelines by 
providing sufficient warning time to take measures to decrease the vulnerability or exposition (alarm system) 
[Wieland et al., 2000]. The networks devoted to site specific EEW are much smaller than those of the regional 
type, only covering the surroundings of the system; the distance of the seismic instruments from the facility 
depends on the lead time needed to activate the safety procedures before the arrival of the more energetic seismic 
phase. Typically the alarm is issued when the ground motion at one or more sensors exceeds a given threshold. 
In fact, unlike the regional case, site-specific EEWS’ only measure the ground shaking at the network and do not 
attempt to estimate the features of the event, which would require unacceptable computational time. Due to a 
large development of regional networks in recent years worldwide [Iervolino et al., 2006c] the question of using 
EEWS’ for site-specific applications is rising. In fact, nowadays real-time seismology allows a hybrid use of 
regional and on-site warning methods [Kanamori, 2005]. Recent efforts on rapid estimation of the earthquake’s 
magnitude and location make available a prediction of the ground motion at the site from a few seconds to a few 
tens of seconds before its arrival.  
The formulation of real-time seismic risk analysis for structure-specific applications of regional EEWS is 
the topic of the study herein presented. The objective is to predict, in a full probabilistic approach, a ground 
motion Intensity Measure (IM) at a site (i.e. Peak Ground Acceleration or PGA) and the performance of a 
structure of interest, in terms of an Engineering Demand Parameter (EDP), conditioned to the real-time 
information provided by the seismic network. A scheme of the hybrid application of a regional network for 
structure-specific earthquake early warning is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Regional EWWS for structure-specific applications 
The risk analysis may help in real-time decision making aimed to vulnerability or exposition reduction. For 
example, EEWS’ predictions may be used for the set-up of active or semi-active structural control, in order to 
achieve a safer structural response to ground motion. In the following, in particular, it will be focused on real-
time probabilistic seismic hazard analysis for risk management purposes; in this case, the seismic network 
estimates the earthquake's features and then the system predicts IM to give additional lead time. This process, 
however, includes significant uncertainty which may lead to false and missed alarms which both have a cost. In 
the case of not alarming, the loss is associated to the earthquake striking without any taken countermeasure; in 
the case of  an alarm, the preparedness interventions have a cost (social and/or economical) which may become a 
loss if the actual ground motion does not require such actions. Therefore, a key issue in the use of EEWS for risk 
management, is the estimation of missed and false alarm probabilities associated to the adopted decisional rule. 
This computation, on an empirical basis, should consist of post-event analysis of EEWS predictions and would 
require a large strong-motion waveforms database both for the network and the site where the structure is 
located. Since very rarely these databases are available, especially for large earthquakes, the missed/false alarms 
rates of occurrence have to be estimated in a simulation framework (e.g. Montecarlo) using appropriate 
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characterizations of the uncertainties involved in the prediction. This approach, which requires virtually no 
records other than those used to calibrate the method adopted for the estimation of magnitude (M) and source-to-
site distance (R), is applied herein to the developing EEWS of the Campanian region (southern Italy) to estimate 
the frequency of error in decisions. 
 
2. SEISMIC RISK ANALYSIS CONDITIONED TO THE EEWS INFORMATION 
 
Recently seismologists have developed several methods that enable to estimate the event’s magnitude on the 
basis of measures made on the first few seconds of P-waves signal. Similarly, as described in the following, the 
source-to-site distance may be predicted analyzing the triggering sequence (i.e. the order in which the seismic 
stations detect the earthquake). Applying these procedures to data gathered by the network, during the 
propagation of the event, it is possible to obtain information about M and R and perform real-time Probabilistic 
Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) [McGuire, 1995]. This results in a seismic hazard analysis conditioned (in a 
probabilistic sense) to the real-time information provided by the EEWS. Consequently, the distribution of the 
structural response may be also computed by Probabilistic Seismic Demand Analysis (PSDA) [Carballo and 
Cornell, 2000]. The probability density function of the structural response at the site when an event is occurring 
contains the highest level of information available, and therefore it seems to be the appropriate tool for real-time 
decision making. 
At a given time t from the earthquake’s origin time, all the real-time information provided by the network can 
be synthesized in terms of Probability Density Functions (PDFs) of M and R. The PDF of M will be indicated as 
( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2| , ,...,Mf mντ τ τ ντ τ τ , because it is conditioned to { }1 2, ,..., ντ τ τ , the vector of measures made by the 
network (a measure for each triggered station). Similarly the PDF of R, which, due to the method adopted (see 
next sections), only depends on the triggering sequence, will be referred as ( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2
| , ,...,R s s sf r s s sν ν ; where { }1 2, ,...,s s sν  is such sequence. It is worth to underline that ν  is the number of instruments which have triggered 
and measured the parameter of interest τ  at the time t. This makes both the distributions time dependent; in fact, 
the amount of data included in the estimation process increases with time (i.e. more stations trigger as time 
flows). These PDFs may be used to compute the probabilistic distribution, or hazard curve, of a ground motion 
IM (i.e. PGA) at a site of interest by the seismic hazard integral reported in Eq.(1). 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2| , ,..., 1 2 | , ,..., 1 2| , | , ,..., | , ,...,ν νν τ τ τ ν ν= τ τ τ∫ ∫ M R s s s
M R
f im f im m r f m f r s s s dr dm  (1) 
The PDF, ( )| ,f im m r , is given by an ordinary attenuation relationship. The subscript ν indicates that the 
computed hazard refers to a particular set of triggered stations and, consequently, also depends on t. For 
structural applications of EEWS the prediction of the structural response in terms of an EDP, rather than in terms 
of a ground motion IM, may be of main concern. This requires a further integration to get the PDF of EDP as 
reported in Eq.(2), 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )|
IM
f edp f edp im f im d imν ν= ∫  (2) 
where the PDF, ( )|f edp im , is the probabilistic relationship between IM and EDP. For Moment Resisting 
Frame (MRF) structures, for example, such relationship is of the type in Eq.(3), relating the Maximum Inter-
storey Drift Ratio (MIDR) to Sa(T1) (first mode spectral acceleration), which are the IM and EDP respectively.  
( )1( ) bMIDR a Sa T ε=  (3) 
In Eq.(3) ε is a log-normal random variable with unit median and variance of the log equal to the variance of the 
log of MIDR, and the coefficients a and b are obtained via non-linear incremental dynamic analysis 
[Vamvatsikos and Cornell, 2002]. Barroso and Winterstein [2002] have proposed a similar relationship for 
controlled structures. For the sake of simplicity it will be assumed in the following that the parameter to be 
predicted is IM only. This would keep the presentation of the method clear and the results of the application 
more easy to interpret. Since EPD is only a probabilistic transformation of IM, this choice would not affect the 
generality of the discussion. 
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2.1 Real-time magnitude and distance estimates 
The integral given in Eq.(1) requires the distribution of magnitude, ( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2
| , ,...,Mf mντ τ τ ντ τ τ , to be estimated 
on the basis of the data provided by the network at a given time. Herein, this PDF has been formulated 
combining, via the Bayes theorem, historical data and real-time information, Eq.(4).  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
, ,..., | 1 2
| , ,..., 1 2
, ,..., | 1 2
, ,..., |
| , ,...,
, ,..., |
MAX
MIN
M M
M M
M M
M
f m f m
f m
f m f m dm
ν
ν
ν
τ τ τ ν
τ τ τ ν
τ τ τ ν
τ τ ττ τ τ
τ τ τ
=
∫
 (4) 
In the Bayesian framework [Berger, 1985], the distribution ( )Mf m , which incorporates the information 
available before the experimental data are collected (e.g. before the network performs the measures, 
{ }1 2, ,..., ντ τ τ ), is called a priori. In the seismic case it is a truncated exponential, Eq.(5), derived by the well 
known Gutenberg-Richter recurrence relationship, 
( )
[ ]
maxmin min max
min max
:
0 ,
m
MM
M
e M m M
f m e e
m M M
β
ββ
β −
−−
⎧ ≤ ≤⎪ −⎨⎪ ∉⎩
 (5) 
where { }min max, ,M Mβ  depend on the seismic features of the region under study. The joint PDF 
( )
1 2, ,..., | 1 2
, ,..., |Mf mντ τ τ ντ τ τ , which reflects all the information concerning the magnitude contained into the real-
time data, is called likelihood function. It has been formulated assuming that, given the magnitude, the iτ  
measurements are lognormal, s-independent and identically distributed random variables of parameters reported 
in Eq.(6) 
( ) ( )
( )
log
log
5.9 7
0.16
Mτ
τ
µ
σ
⎧ = −⎪⎨ =⎪⎩
 (6) 
The value of ( )log τµ  is provided by the work of Allen and Kanamori [2003] about the relationship between the 
magnitude of the event and the log of the predominant period, τ , of the first four seconds of the P-waves (in the 
velocity recording) for the TriNet network. The dispersion, ( )log τσ , has been retrieved from the data reported in 
the same paper under the omoskedasticity hypothesis. Then the likelihood results as reported in Eq.(7). 
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 (7) 
Since the Bayes theorem enable to correct the a priori on the basis of the data collected in real-time, the 
posterior ( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2
| , ,...,Mf mντ τ τ ντ τ τ , for its own nature, incorporates all the information that is effectively 
available. It is worth to underline that lognormality, s-independence and omoskedasticity, hypotheses do not 
conflict either with results reported in Allen and Kanamori [2003] or with the methods adopted to perform the 
analyses presented in the same work. Nevertheless, substituting Eq.(7) and Eq.(6) in Eq.(4), is possible to show 
that ( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2
| , ,...,Mf mντ τ τ ντ τ τ  depends on data only through the summation of station measurements logarithms 
and the number of instruments triggered. This may largely reduce the required real-time computational effort. In 
fact, also due to the features of the source-to-site distance PDF, the hazard integral may be performed offline for 
all 
1
log( ),i
i
ν τ ν
=
⎧ ⎫⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑  pairs. 
The real-time localization methodology considered is that of Satriano et al. [2006]  which is based on 
Horiuchi et al. [2005] and the Equal Differential-Time (EDT) formulation [Font et al., 2004],[Lomax, 2005]. The 
EDT location is given by the maximum of a stack over quasi-hyperbolic surfaces, defined by the equal 
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differential time equations, where the difference in calculated travel-times to a pair of stations is equal to the 
difference in observed arrival times for the two stations. For a detailed discussion of the method the reader 
should refer to the cited papers, a brief description of the procedure is given in the following for readability of 
the present study. Within 3 seconds reliable location (few kilometers uncertainty) can be obtained, also in the 
case of multiple, concurring events. Consequently, the estimate of the epicentral distance, 
( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2| , ,...,R s s sf r s s sν ν , may be retrieved by a geometrical transformation assigning, to any particular 
distance value, a probability which is the sum of the probabilities of all points of the grid with the same 
epicentral distance to the site.  
 
3. DECISIONAL RULE AND THE CRY WOLF ISSUE 
 
Once the EWWS provides a distribution of the ground motion intensity measure, or seismic demand for the 
structure of interest, a decisional condition has to be checked to launch the alarm or not. Several options are 
available to formulate a decisional rule, for example the alarm may be issued if the probability of the random 
variable exceeding a critical threshold ( CIM ) outcrosses a reference value ( CP ) as in Eq.(8). The CP  and 
CIM values have to be set in relation to an appropriate loss function for the structure of interest and the 
acceptable probabilities of error in decision [Iervolino et al. 2006a]. 
( ) ( )
0
: 1 [ ]
CIM
C CAlarm if f im d im P IM IM Pν− = > >∫   (8) 
The performance of the early warning system may be tested verifying if it “correctly” predicts the distribution of 
IM at the site; the efficiency of the decisional rule may be evaluated in terms of false and missed alarms 
probabilities (the cry wolf issue), FAP  and MAP  respectively. The false alarm occurs when, on the basis of the 
information processed by the EEWS, the alarm is issued while the intensity measure at the site TIM  (T subscript 
means “true” indicating the realization of the random variable to distinguish it from the prediction) is lower than 
the threshold CIM ; the missed alarm corresponds to not launching the alarm if needed, Eq.(9). 
{ }
{ }
:
:
T C
T C
Missed Alarm No Alarm IM IM
False Alarm Alarm IM IM
⎧ ∩ >⎪⎨ ∩ ≤⎪⎩
  (9) 
It has been discussed how the information and the uncertainties involved are dependent on the number of stations 
triggered at a certain time. Therefore, in principle, the decisional rules may be checked at any time since the first 
station has triggered and, consequently, the false and missed alarm probabilities are, also indirectly, a function of 
time. From this point of view the decisional process is again time dependent, and one may decide to alarm when 
the trade-off between the available lead time and the losses related to a missed or a false alarm is at its optimum. 
As an application, probabilities of these events according to the decisional rule, have been estimated by 
simulation for the Campanian EEWS. 
 
4. SIMULATION OF THE SAMS EARTHQUAKE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
The Campanian early warning system (SAMS - Seismic Alert Management System) is based on the seismic 
network located in the Campano-Lucano Appennines [Weber et al., 2006]. Such network is operating in the 
seismically most active area for the Campanian region (100x80km2 wide) and it is designed to acquire non-
saturated data for earthquakes larger than WM  4. In Figure 2 the 30 stations of the EEWS network (dark 
squares),  the WM  > 2 events recorded from 1981 to 2002 and the faulting system of the Irpinia 1980 earthquake 
are given. Light color squares represent additional stations which will be used to calibrate local attenuation 
relationships. 
The real-time seismic hazard analysis procedure presented was applied to simulate the predictions of the 
SAMS and to assess the false/missed alarms probabilities. (In principle, to simulate the prediction of the IM and 
to compare it with the actual value at the site, for any event, a set of recordings in each station and at the site 
should be available. However, it is possible to simulate the behavior of the system without recorded signals, 
which are not available especially for rare events, but still on an empirical basis.) The procedure (Figure 3) has 
been implemented in a computer code and it takes advantage of the discussed methods for the estimation of 
magnitude and distance. The predicted IM is the PGA. 
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Figure 2: The sensors network and the background seismicity of the region 
Each run simulates a specific seismic event occurring in the area of interest and consists of three steps: (1) 
Simulation of event’s features (e.g. assignment of magnitude, location and true PGA at the site); (2) Simulation 
of the measurements and predictions (e.g. real-time PSHA) made by the network at any instant until the trigger 
of all the stations; (3) Check of the decisional rule and of the false/missed alarm conditions; (4) Increase of 
false/missed alarms counter to compute the frequencies of occurrence. The site considered in the simulation is 
assumed to be in the city of Naples, which is approximately 110km far from the center of the network (30s lead 
time). 
 
Figure 3: Simulation’s flow chart 
 
4.1 Event and ground motion features generation 
 
Each run in the Montecarlo simulation starts with the generation of the geophysical features the EEWS will try 
to estimate. These values will define the earthquake of that run. In other words, in order to compute the PSHA 
conditioned to the EEWS information, the distributions of M and R are required, then it is needed to establish the 
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true value of those which will be called TM  and TR  (true magnitude and true source-to-site-distance 
respectively). The true magnitude of the event ( TM ) may be sampled according to the Gutenberg-Richter 
recurrence relationship for the Campanian region (in Eq.(5): β = 1.69, minM = 4, maxM = 7), this will lead, over 
many runs, to a marginal evaluation of the EEWS performances. On the other hand, one may be interested in 
evaluating the EEWS’ performance with respect to a specific magnitude; in this case TM  for the all runs in the 
simulation has to be set to a fixed value of interest. This is useful in the light of assessing the EEWS 
performance conditioning it to high magnitude events, which are the more threatening. The location of the 
epicenter may be randomly chosen sampling its coordinates { },epi epix y  from two s-independent uniform 
distributions defined in the area covered by the network. Once the epicentral coordinates are set, the distance TR  
to the site (e.g. Naples) is readily obtained. Again, for some purposes one may want to set the location of the 
epicenter to the same point assigning the same value of TR  for all the simulations. In the following, for both 
TM  and TR , this second option will be followed for sake of clarity and readability of results. The generation (or 
assignment) of a “true” magnitude and “true” distance in each Montecarlo run allows to get reference values for 
the prediction of the EEWS; similarly, the “true” ground motion at the site ( TPGA ) should also be set. The PGA 
experienced at the site is required to establish whether the decision, ensuing the decisional rule, produced in that 
run, a missed or a false alarm. The value of TPGA , consistent with the values of TM  and TR , is obtained by 
sampling the attenuation relationship which, by definition, provides the PDF of the ground motion intensity 
measure conditioned to { },T TM R . (If many recorded signals would be available at the site for a given 
magnitude the empirical distribution of the PGA, as retrieved by the records, should be the same as provided by 
the attenuation law.) Herein the Sabetta and Pugliese [1996] attenuation is considered in its epicentral 
formulation. Therefore, in each run the value of TPGA  is sampled from a completely specified lognormal 
random variable. Finally the event is defined for the EEWS purposes since { }, ,T T TM R PGA  of the run are set; 
the next step consists of simulating the measurements at the stations consistently with these event’s features. 
 
4.2 Station measurements and M,R real-time distributions 
 
In the simulation process, at any given time t, the number ν  and sequence of stations triggered is computed 
assuming a homogeneous and isotropic propagation model with P- and S-waves velocities of 5.5km/s ( PV ) and 
3.5km/s ( SV ) respectively. Similarly the lead time, defined as the remaining seconds required by the S-waves to 
hit the site, is calculated. Once the event is defined by { }, ,T T TM R PGA , the measurements of τ  for the 
triggered stations are needed to perform the real-time risk analysis. For example let’s consider first the case 
when only one station should have measured τ . It is possible to simulate the station’s measurement by sampling 
the empirical distribution of τ  conditioned to the true magnitude of the event, ( )| |M Tf Mτ τ . Real τ  values 
measured from recorded signals would be distributed as ( )| |M Tf Mτ τ  by definition, and therefore such 
sampling is appropriate in a simulation approach. To generate τ  for more than one station, consistently with 
section 2.1, the measurements are considered s-independent conditionally to the event’s magnitude ( TM ). 
Therefore, if ν  stations are triggered, all the ν  components of the { }1 2, ,..., ντ τ τ  vector are obtained by 
sampling ν  times the ( )| |M Tf Mτ τ  PDF. Specific Campanian ( )| |Mf mτ τ  are not yet available and data by 
Allen and Kanamori [2003] have to be used, they are based on τ  measurements on four seconds of recording, 
then herein the working hypothesis is that any station’s measurement is considered in the process if four seconds 
have passed from its trigger. Once the measurements vector { }1 2, ,..., ντ τ τ  is defined, the discussed Bayesian 
method may be applied to compute the magnitude’s distribution. In Figure 4 (left) the resulting magnitude PDFs, 
for a single simulation of an M 6 event, are given. When only few stations are triggered, the distributions 
underestimate the magnitude. In fact, when data are few the dominating information is that a priori of Eq.(5), 
which naturally tends to give larger occurrence probability to low magnitude events. More precisely, the 
Bayesian approach will tend to produce overestimates of magnitude when it is below the a priori mean and it will 
tend to underestimate it when it is larger then the mean. This effect is directly proportional to the difference 
between the expected value of the a priori and TM  and inversely proportional to the size of measurements’ 
vector. As more measurements became available, the prediction centers on the real value with a relatively small 
uncertainty. An estimator with these features is said biased by classic statisticians and other methods can be 
considered to get an unbiased estimators (i.e. maximum likelihood). Nevertheless the Bayesian approach was 
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preferred because, even slightly biased, it gives, in the mean, smaller estimation errors due to the use of the a 
priori information. The distribution of the source-to-site distance, ( )
1 2| , ,..., 1 2| , ,...,R S S Sf r S S Sν ν , is only 
dependent on the sequence of stations triggered at t, which is known by computing the P-waves travel times 
( ,e j j Pt R V= where jR  is the distance of the j-th station from the epicenter) for all the stations in the network. It 
has been shown that, due to the features of the SAMS, the localization method, after only three seconds from the 
first trigger, determines the epicenter’s with only 1km of uncertainty [Satriano et al., 2006], which is negligible 
in respect to the other uncertainties involved in the process. Therefore, in principle, since the magnitude 
estimation starts after four seconds from the trigger of the first station, at that time it may be assumed that the 
source-to-site distance is known. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The hazard integral of Eq.(1), with the estimated distributions of M and R and the attenuation relationship, 
allows the exceeding probability of PGA at the site to be computed as the event evolves and the stations trigger. 
The hazard curves of Figure 4 (right) show that the hazard increases as time flows (more τ  measurements 
available), consistently with the magnitude estimation results given in the left plot. 
 
Figure 4: Magnitude distribution (left) and EWWS conditioned seismic hazard (right) as the number of 
stations increases (MT=6, RT=91km) 
To discuss the hazard computed with the EEWS information, it may be compared to the “maximum 
knowledge status” which is the hazard calculated adopting the true value of magnitude and distance (this 
corresponds to consider no uncertainty in the M and R estimations). Such comparison is shown in Figure 5 (left): 
the thick curve represents the complementary Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for the PGA when TM  (7) 
and TR  (110km) are deterministically known; the thin curves are the results of 200 simulations. (In the figure 
only the hazard curves corresponding to the case when all the stations triggered, ν = 30, are reported.) The 
EEWS’ hazard correctly approximates the maximum knowledge condition even with significant variability of 
the curves. To reduce the latter, two strategies are possible: (a) developing more efficient procedures for rapid-
estimation of magnitude or (b) increasing the size of the measurement sample, for instance, having a larger set of 
seismic stations in the source area [Iervolino et al. 2006b]. 
The simulation allows the computation of the frequency of false and missed alarms. For example, these 
probabilities are estimated by Eq.(10), where the numerator is the number of occurrence of MA or FA and TOTN  
is the number of simulated events.  
[ ]
[ ]
⎧ ⎡ ⎤≅ > ≤ ∩ >⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎨ ⎡ ⎤≅ > > ∩ ≤⎪ ⎣ ⎦⎩
MA C C T C TOT
FA C C T C TOT
P N P PGA PGA P PGA PGA N
P N P PGA PGA P PGA PGA N
 (10) 
In Figure 5 such estimations are given for M 7 events with an epicentral distance of 110km ( 410  simulations). 
The curves are a function of time because the real-time PSHA is performed at each second from the first 
measurement, therefore, the decisional rule may be checked at any instant; consequently the false and missed 
alarm occurrences reflect the case if the decision of alarming or not would be taken at that instant. 
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 To better understand the results of Figure 5 it is useful to discuss the given curves. The CPGA , in 
decisional rule of Eq.(8), is arbitrarily set to 0.3m/s2 and the critical probability of exceedance ( CP ) is 0.2; the 
true values of magnitude and distance are 7TM =  and 110TR km=  respectively. The chosen maximum 
knowledge status (e.g. the attenuation relationship conditioned to TM  and TR ) gives [ ] 0.81CP PGA PGA> = , 
then if CP  is equal to 0.2, the right decision would be to alarm in every run. As a consequence the probability of 
missed alarm is zero by design, because the alarm should always be issued, and the probability of a false alarm is 
[ ]CP PGA PGA≤  or 1-0.81 = 0.19. These probabilities are intrinsic to the decisional rule and the thresholds set. 
 
Figure 5: EWWS conditioned seismic hazard (left) compared to the maximum knowledge condition; false 
and missed alarm probabilities (right) for 104 events (MT=7, RT=110km, PGAC=0.3m/s2, PC=0.2). 
However, as discussed, the EEWS cannot perfectly estimate the hazard curve with TM  and TR  known. In fact, 
due to the variability of the estimations the value of [ ]CP PGA PGA>  is sometimes underestimated and 
sometimes overestimated. For example the underestimation of [ ]CP PGA PGA>  may lead to not issue the alarm 
even if required and therefore the missed alarm probability is not zero. In particular, when there are few 
triggered stations this underestimation effect is strong, and the missed alarm probability is relatively high 
because when the alarm is not launched (incorrectly) it will most likely result is a missed alarm (in fact the true 
[ ]CP PGA PGA>  is 0.81).  As time increases the estimation improves; at 10s since the first trigger 23 station out 
of 30 have measured τ ,  and [ ]CP PGA PGA>   approaches its correct value (0.81) , then the missed and false 
alarm probabilities also tend to their correct values, 0 and 0.19 respectively. This means that, when all stations 
are triggered, the systems would work according to what designed. This would suggest to alarm when MAP  and 
FAP  are at their a priori values, however this happens only since a certain time, when a sufficient number of 
stations is triggered, this means that alarming in the early seconds of the event gives additional lead time but 
implies to accept some error probability which may be intolerable. The shape of the curves depends on what both 
the chosen values of CPGA  and CP  may be, consequently, they may vary different from those discussed in this 
example if other values of the thresholds are concerned. Nevertheless, given the missed and false alarms 
reference values, calculated by means of the hazard conditioned to TM  and TR , the system may be calibrated 
setting CPGA  and CP  by an appropriate loss function. The choice of CPGA  mainly depends on the seismic 
response of the protected infrastructure and on the related damage to structural and non structural elements, 
while the choice of CP  is related to the consequences of a false/missed protection action and on the minimum 
lead time necessary to develop this protection action in a safe manner. 
    
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study presented in this paper investigated use of Earthquake Early Warning Systems for real-time decision 
making and seismic risk management. The information provided by the seismic network on magnitude and 
source-to-site distance, on a developing event, may be treated as in the classic hazard analysis which is the basis 
to obtain a prediction of the required structural or non structural performance. The approach has been tested 
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simulating the Campanian early warning system implementing recent advances of real-time seismology in a 
probabilistic framework. Results indicate that the PSHA, conditioned to the EEWS measures, correctly 
approximates the hazard computed if the magnitude and distance would be deterministically known, which is the 
maximum level of knowledge. The residual variability may be reduced adopting more efficient  estimation 
methods or, if possible, designing a more dense seismic network.  
While real-time seismic risk analysis seems the way to use all the information provided by the Earthquake 
Early Warning System, on the other hand the prediction involves significant uncertainty which cannot be 
neglected. Decisional rule and alarm thresholds have intrinsic missed and false alarm probabilities which should 
be set according to appropriate loss functions related to the system to protect. Simulations, by means of time 
dependent curves, show how the rates of error in decision evolve with time approaching to their design values as 
the number of triggered stations increases. Such curves may be used for risk management optimizing the trade 
off between the probability of wrong decisions and the available lead time for risk reduction actions. 
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